dense wireless/internet-of-things networks. To overcome this challenge, the OFDM technique is considered in this study.
I. INTRODUCTION
I N RECENT years, the number of mobile users/applications have increased dramatically. This results severe mobile data traffic in the cellular coverage areas. A combined orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) technique and relayassited networks have made a great contribution to cover these capacity and throughput demands. However, information security demands are still an open challenge, which needs to be enhanced with cutting edge techniques. Until quite recently, the higher level encryption techniques, Rivest Shamir Adleman (RSA) [1] and advanced encryption standard (AES) [2] , have been considered. However, these techniques do not provide a broad solution for the secure communication demands. In this regard, Wyner's [3] wiretap channels brought a new perspective and turn out to be a pioneering technique for the physical layer (PHY) security of wireless communications.
Recently, non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) strategy [4] has got much attention in the eyes of the researcher for the multi-user information exchange process. This is because, the NOMA strategy allows each user to access all sub-carrier channels, which directly affects the spectral efficiency [4] . It is also reported in [4] that the NOMA strategy achieves better performance than orthogonal multiple access strategies. However, since the NOMA technique employs the successive interference cancellation technique for the signal decoding, the last user should wait the other users' decoding process. This challenge is named as user-delay decoding process in the literature. This is indeed a big challenge especially in of a finite number of friendly jammers and also investigates secrecy outage probability (SOP) performance. This paper distinguishes itself from aforementioned studies in a several ways. The differences can be summarized as: First, this paper utilizes a multi-user untrustworthy AF HD/FD based TWR system structure that considers OFDM strategy. Second, this paper utilizes the SOP performance metric and investigates the secrecy performance of given system structure, which is presented in figure 1 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II provides the channel statistics and system structure details. Section III presents the analytical derivations. Section IV provides the numerical results and the paper is finalized in section V.
Notations: The F h (.) and f h (.) represent the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and the probability density function (PDF) of a random variables (RVs) h, respectively. The E[.] term represents the expectation, while the Pr(.) represents the probability. All log are considered base 2. The term G m,n p,q represents the Meijer-G function [12] and the term G m,0:m1,n1:m2,n2 q,p:p1,q1:p2,q2
is the extended generalized bivariate Meijer-G function (EGBMGF) [13, Eq. (13) ]. Figure 1 plots a multi-user AF based untrustworthy twoway HD/FD based relaying network. Figure 1 also plots that to mitigate the information leakage, the illegitimate terminal is under the effect of a finite number of friendly jammers. Here, x k and y k , ∀ k = 1, ..., N , conduct information exchange, by means of k th sub-carrier among N , via a single HD/FD based untrustworthy TWR terminal. In the case that the untrustworthy relay terminal in HD mode, the user terminals conduct information exchange in two phases, which are multiple access (MAC) and broadcast (BC), while it requires a single phase, which is MAC, for the FD mode. Please note that MAC and BC channels are considered as reciprocal in such a system model. x k and y k terminals do not have a directlink because of the possible obstacles. It is also assumed that legitimate/illegitimate terminals posses a single omnidirectional antenna in the system model.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND CHANNEL STATISTICS
In figure 1 , h k and g k , ∀ k = 1, ..., N represent the channel impulse responses between x k → untrustworthy relay and y k → untrustworthy relay, respectively. h k are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian RVs with zero mean and variances σ 2
, and c k ∼ CN (0, σ 2 c k ) represent the loopinterference (LI), which is caused by transmitting and receiving the signal at the same time period, at x k , y k , and untrustworthy relay, respectively. f j are also i.i.d. and f j ∼ CN (0, σ 2 fj ), ∀ j = 1, ..., M is the channel impulse response, j th friendly jammer → relay. Amplitudes of all channels are distributed according to the Rayleigh distributions. 
A. The Half-Duplex Case
This subsection now turns its attention to the illegitimate terminal operates in the HD mode. The received signals at the HD based illegitimate relay terminal on k th sub-carrier can be written as
Here, m x k and m y k represent the corresponding transmit information of x k and y k on k th sub-carrier, respectively.
Here, E[|m x k | 2 ] = 1, E[|m y k | 2 ] = 1, and E[|d j | 2 ] = 1. P s represents the corresponding transmit power of x k and y k terminals. P J represents the j th friendly jammer's transmit power. n r k is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the untrustworthy relay terminal on k th sub-carrier. The leakage rate (LR) expressions with regard to x k and y k on k th subcarrier can be written as
Since the untrustworthy relay terminal in AF mode, the amplification factor, which is G, on k th sub-carrier can be calculated as
where P r represents the untrustworthy relay terminal's transmit power. In the second phase, the untrustworthy relay terminal broadcasts the amplified version of the received signals to the user-pairs. The received signal at x k on k th sub-carrier can be calculated as
Substituting (4) into (5) , the signal-to-interference noise ratio (SINR) at x k on k th sub-carrier can be calculated as
where ϕ = Pr Ps [14] . Likewise, γ y k on k th sub-carrier can be calculated as
B. Full-Duplex Case
The subsection assumes that the illegitimate terminal runs in the FD mode. In this regard, the received signal at the illegitimate terminal on k th sub-carrier can be written as
By using (8) , the LR expressions with respect to x k and y k on k th sub-carrier can be calculated as
Here, γ c k = Pr |c k | 2 σ 2 . The G amplification factor on k th subcarrier for the FD case can be re-calculated as
The received signal at x k on k th sub-carrier can be calculated as
Substituting (11) into (12) and doing some mathematical manipulations, the received SINR at x k on k th sub-carrier can be calculated as in (13) . Likewise, the received SINR at y k on k th sub-carrier can be calculated as in (14) .
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
This section gives analytical derivations related to the secrecy of the multi-user HD/FD based relay-assisted TWR with OFDM strategy. In this regard, the SOP is considered as a performance metric and the details are presented in following subsection.
A. The Secrecy Outage Probability
The SOP is defined as the secrecy achievable rate, which is based on subtracting the LR expression from the system total achievable rate, cannot support R in bps/Hz, which is a predefined target rate. From the analytical perspective, by using the logarithm properties, the SOP can also be defined as the CDF of the secrecy achievable rate's received SINR evaluated at target threshold rate, γ th . The total secrecy rate expression at X line users with respect to HD and FD strategies are given as follows:
where [x] + = max(0, x). The end-to-end (e2e) SOP for HD and FD cases can be written as
Here, R HD Y and R F D Y are the symmetry of R HD X and R F D X , respectively. The CDF expressions of (17) and (18) can be calculated as in the proposition 1 and proposition 2, respectively.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section provides numerical results, which is based on monte-carlo simulations, regarding the system e2e secrecy outage performance. The friendly jammers are located by using the Euclidean distance formulation, which is d −v [15] , in the system model. The d term represents the distance and v term represents the path-loss exponent, which takes values between 2-6 [15] . In simulation setup, the d and v terms are set to 10 and 2, respectively. In this regard, the friendly jammers' transmit power, P J , is chosen relatively low, which is P J ≪ P T , P J = P T /100, in comparison to user-pairs' total transmit powers, which is P T = 2N P s + P r . In an equal interference and user-pairs' transmit power case, the external interference severely degrades the system performance [16] . The number of the friendly jammer, which is M , is set to 1 and the friendly jammers' channel variances, which is σ 2 fj are set to 10 −2 .
By using the signal processing strategies and special antenna design, the LI effects can be minimized. In this regard, the LI variances at x k and y k , which are σ 2 a k and σ 2 c k , and at untrustworthy relay terminal, which is σ 2 b k , are modeled as: P λ−1 s and P λ−1 r , respectively. The λ term takes values between 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 [17] . The λ term is set to 0.1 in the simulation setup. The number of the mobile terminal, which is N , is set to 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 in the system model setup. The x k and y k have P s transmit power and the untrustworthy relay terminal has P r transmit power. In this regard, as earlier mentioned the system total transmit power is equal to P T = 2N P s + P r . Two different target rates, which are R = 1 bps/Hz and R = 3 bps/Hz, are considered in the performance analysis. Figure 2 and figure 3 utilize R = 1 bps/Hz and R = 3 bps/Hz target rates, respectively. Commenting the figure 2 and 3 based on the aforementioned system model configurations, following results can be obtained. Figure 2 presents the e2e secrecy outage performance comparison of the HD and FD based system model configurations. According to figure 2, a large number of user achieve better e2e secrecy outage performance than a small number of user in low and high SNR regimes. This is because a large number of sub-carrier allow more users to conduct information exchange compared to a small number of users. This also means that a large number of users posses more total transmit powers, which is directly related to P T = 2N P s + P r . Results also show that the secrecy outage performance curves tend to saturate in high SNR regimes. This is because the friendly jammers' negative effects on the system secrecy performance. In addition, the system model that operates in HD mode achieves slightly better outage performance than FD mode. This is because the LI effect on the FD mode. A large number of user reach the 10 −5 outage levels while a small number of users saturate in high outage regimes, which is around 10 −2 and 10 −4 . Figure 3 also plots the e2e secrecy outage performance comparison of the HD and FD based system model. Differently from figure 2, the figure 3 utilizes the R = 3 bps/Hz. As in figure 2 , a large number of users achieve better secrecy outage performance than a small number of users. In addition, the HD based system model achieves slightly better performance than FD mode. However, the outage performance gap between two modes become less then R = 1 bps/Hz. This is because the pre-log factor differences as described in (15) and (16) . In addition, by definition of the secrecy outage probability, which is described in section III A, the outage performance curves slightly move to the high SNR regimes. 
V. CONCLUSION This study has investigated the secrecy performance of the multi-user HD/FD based relay-assisted TWR with OFDM strategy. In reference to Monte-Carlo computer simulations, the HD based untrustworthy relaying system achieves better secrecy outage performance in comparison to FD case. Results have also showed that the friendly jammers beside minimizing the information leakage also result in system coding gain losses in high SNR regimes. In addition, in the case that the target rate increases the system secrecy performance gets worse.
Proposition 2:
The CDF expression of R F D e2e can be calculated as
where
Proof: See Appendix B.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Considering (15) and utilizing the definition of the logarithm properties and Appendix II of [16] and also Appendix A of [11] , R HD X can be re-written as
Following the same procedures as in (21) 
In order to continue the analysis, (22) requires F γx k and F γy k expressions. Before starting these derivations, because of the intractable form of (6) and (7) , this paper upper-bound these expressions by using the XY X+Y ≤ min(X, Y) as in (23) and
(24), respectively.
where A = γ S1 , B = γs 2 (ϕγA+ϕ+1) , C = γs 1 (ϕγA+ϕ+1) , D = γ s2 , and γ A = γ J +1. The CDF expression of (23) can be calculated as in (25).
Since the amplitude of all channels are distributed according to the Rayleigh distribution, the PDF expressions of γ s1 and γ s2 can be written as:
Ps Ω h
Ps Ωg , respectively [18] . where Ω h =E |h| 2 and Ω g =E |g| 2 . In light of all these information, F γs 1 γ th ϕ −1 and F γs 2 γ th ϕ −1 (ϕγ A + ϕ + 1) can be computed as:
Sum of M i.i.d. Rayleigh distribution become a Gamma distribution [18] . Within this scope, the PDF expression of γ J can be expressed as: (26) 
Following the same procedures, F γ HD y k γ HD th can be computed as
To continue the analysis, (22) also requires the f γx k ,R (γ) and f γy k ,R (γ) derivations. Starting with (2), following expressions can be obtained. 
The derivative of (30) yields the f γx k ,R (γ) as 
Ps Ω h k 
The α term in [13, Eq. (13) ] is set to 1. Utilizing the partial fraction decomposition technique, fourth integral term in (34) can be written as in (36).
Ps Ω h j y+1 M . By using the distributed properties and [20, Eq. (10, 11) ] and also [20, Eq. (21) ] for solving the integral expression, (36) can be obtained as in (37). 
, and
Likewise, following the same procedures, Υ term in (22), can be obtained as in the second part of (19) . Please note that, J ee = lim y→−
Ps 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Utilizing (16) and considering the same procedures as in
can be obtained. Utilizing these two expressions in (18) and following the same procedures as in (22), following expressions can be obtained.
Because of the intractable form of (13) and (14), these expressions can be upper-bounded by using XY X+Y ≤ min(X, Y) as in (39) and (40), respectively.
where W = γx γC +1 , Z = γy (ϕγA+ϕγB +γC +ϕ+1) , T = γy γD+1 , U = γx (ϕγA+ϕγB+γD +ϕ+1) , γ B = γ c k + 1, γ C = γ a k + 1, and γ D = γ b k + 1. Considering the same methodology as in (25), the CDF expression of (39) can be achieved as
Substituting f γJ (γ), f γc (γ) = 
Likewise, considering the same methodologies as in (42), the F γ F D y k γ FD th can be obtained as
Ps Ω h k (43)
This subsection now focuses on the CDF derivation of LR expressions. By using (9) and (10) and also considering the similar methodologies as in (29), the LR expressions with respect to x k and y k can be obtained as in (44) and (45), respectively.
The derivative of (44) and (45) yields the f γx k ,R γ FD th and f γy k ,R γ FD th as in (46) and (47), respectively.
Substituting (42) and (46) into (38) and utilizing the distributive property, (48) can be obtained. Considering the partial fraction decomposition technique and also utilizing [20, Eq. (10, 11) ] and also [20, Eq. (21) ] for solving the integral expression, first, second, third, and fourth integrals in (48) can be solved as in the first part of (20) . Please note that following the same procedures the fifth integral expression in (48) can be solved as in (20) . The other integral expressions, which are sixth, seventh, and eighth, in (48) can be solved by following the same procedures. In addition, the ζ term in (38) can also be obtained by following the same procedures as the Ψ term in (38). However, because of the space limitation these derivation details and the results are omitted. Please also note that A * = lim 
